Imagine that three city council members are trying to decide how to spend a surplus. The options currently being debated are (i) spend it on improving primary education in the municipality, (ii) spend it on improving the level of medical care offered by the local hospital, or (iii) lower local taxes and use the surplus to cover the costs of existing programs. The council employs majority rule to make its decisions. The councillors have the following preference orderings over the spending choices: Councillor 1: Education, Medical, Tax cutCouncillor 2: Medical, Tax cut, EducationCouncillor 3: Tax cut, Education, Medical Assume that the councillors hold a round-robin tournament that pits each alternative against every other alternative in a series of pair-wise votes. The winner is the alternative that wins the most contests. Based on this information, answer questions 17 and 18

The missing statement is question is;

Which of the outcomes, if any, is a Condorcet winner?

Explanation:

As per the question scenario and asked answer about Condorcet winner, the answer is that there would be no Condorcet winner in this case.

It is a specific case where the cumulative preferences of a group cannot be justified to be rational, although every member can provide a rational preference.

As we can see in given case that we cant say that improving education or medical facility or reducing taxes will not benefit public so all three have justified rational of serving public

well since twins have about the same dna they dont have one think in common which is the figer print. nobodys fingerprint is the same. if your using twin you would most likely get around the same results for both of them because of the genetics.. i hope this

the article must be ratified by three-fourths (38) of states within a proscribed deadline.

source: