According to natural rights theory, moral requirements cannot be grounded in human nature.

In most modern non-positivist concepts of human rights, their own legal nature is denied; they are given a religious, moral, or social (pre-legal) nature. These approaches lead to the “erosion” of the concept of human rights and the unlimited expansion of the list of claims that can be qualified in this way. The inevitable consequence of this is the arbitrariness of such qualifications and, ultimately, a decrease in the level of human rights guarantees. Natural human rights turn into something absolutely indefinite and lose their regulatory significance. It is no coincidence that in modern studies, there is a rejection of a meaningful, substantive interpretation of human rights and the spread of purely applied (so-called political, structural, status) their concepts, in which human rights are interpreted as derivatives of existing institutional mechanisms and procedures for their protection. Giving natural human rights legal, directly regulatory significance requires a clear definition, which allows them to be distinguished from other claims, requirements, values, benefits and needs.

Explanation:

taking a bath requires the most water out of the given options because it takes a significant amount of water in order to fill a bathtub.