a ball is dropped from the top of a 46.0 m -high cliff. at the same time, a carefully aimed stone is thrown straight up from the bottom of the cliff with a speed of 22.0 m/s . the stone and ball collide part way up.
how far above the base of the cliff does this happen?

at t=46/22, x=24 699/1210 ≈ 24.56m

Explanation:

The general equation for location is:

x(t) = x₀ + v₀·t + 1/2 a·t²

Where:

x(t) is the location at time t. Let's say this is the height above the base of the cliff.

x₀ is the starting position. At the base of the cliff we'll take x₀=0 and at the top x₀=46.0

v₀ is the initial velocity. For the ball it is 0, for the stone it is 22.0.

a is the standard gravity. In this example it is pointed downwards at -9.8 m/s².

Now that we have this formula, we have to write it two times, once for the ball and once for the stone, and then figure out for which t they are equal, which is the point of collision.

Ball: x(t) = 46.0 + 0 - 1/2*9.8 t²

Stone: x(t) = 0 + 22·t - 1/2*9.8 t²

Since both objects are subject to the same gravity, the 1/2 a·t² term cancels out on both side, and what we're left with is actually quite a simple equation:

46 = 22·t

so t = 46/22 ≈ 2.09

Put this t back into either original (i.e., with the quadratic term) equation and get:

x(46/22) = 46 - 1/2 * 9.806 * (46/22)² ≈ 24.56 m

relativism, roughly put, is the view that truth and falsity, right and wrong, standards of reasoning, and procedures of justification are products of differing conventions and frameworks of assessment and that their authority is confined to the context giving rise to them. more precisely, “relativism” covers views which maintain that—at a high level of abstraction—at least some class of things have the properties they have (e.g., beautiful, morally good, epistemically justified) not simpliciter, but only relative to a given framework of assessment (e.g., local cultural norms, individual standards), and correspondingly, that the truth of claims attributing these properties holds only once the relevant framework of assessment is specified or supplied. relativists characteristically insist, furthermore, that if something is only relatively so, then there can be no framework-independent vantage point from which the matter of whether the thing in question is so can be established.

relativism has been, in its various guises, both one of the most popular and most reviled philosophical doctrines of our time. defenders see it as a harbinger of tolerance and the only ethical and epistemic stance worthy of the open-minded and tolerant. detractors dismiss it for its alleged incoherence and uncritical intellectual permissiveness. debates about relativism permeate the whole spectrum of philosophical sub-disciplines. from ethics to epistemology, science to religion, political theory to ontology, theories of meaning and even logic, philosophy has felt the need to respond to this heady and seemingly subversive idea. discussions of relativism often also invoke considerations relevant to the very nature and methodology of philosophy and to the division between the so-called “analytic and continental” camps in philosophy. and yet, despite a long history of debate going back to plato and an increasingly large body of writing, it is still difficult to come to an agreed definition of what, at its core, relativism is, and what philosophical import it has. this entry attempts to provide a broad account of the many ways in which “relativism” has been defined, explained, defended and criticized.

explanation:

number of electrons for neutral cl