Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniences from the source just mentioned must necessarily be submitted to in the formation of the legislature; but it is unnecessary, and therefore
unwise, to introduce them into the constitution of the Executive. It is here too that they may be most
pernicious. In the legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit. The differences of
opinion, and the jarrings of parties in that department of the government, though they may sometimes
obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote deliberation and circumspection, and serve to check excesses
in the majority. When a resolution too is once taken, the opposition must be at an end. That resolution is
a law, and resistance to it punishable. But no favorable circumstances palliate or atone for the
disadvantages of dissension in the executive department. Here, they are pure and unmixed. There is no
point at which they cease to operate. They serve to embarrass and weaken the execution of the plan or
measure to which they relate, from the first step to the final conclusion of it. They constantly counteract
those qualities in the Executive which are the most necessary ingredients in its composition, vigor and
expedition, and this without any counter balancing good. In the conduct of war, in which the energy of
the Executive is the bulwark of the national security, everything would be to be apprehended from its
plurality.
While Hamilton opposes a “plural" executive, why is a "numerous” legislature (one made up of
many rather than one individuals) beneficial and preferable?