There are over one hundred small white rabbits here in the laboratory today for the Draize test, immobilized by their positions in their small containers, with only their heads sticking out. An assistant is placing a drop of the newest cologne or perfume directly into each of the animal‘s eyes. The bucking and kicking of these small subjects seems to indicate that they are experiencing severe pain as a result of this experiment. Yet it seems necessary in order to ensure that humans do not experience eye injuries resulting from the use of this product. Thereafter the animals will be analyzed and destroyed. Is it right under any circumstances to experiment with animals? Do we have a moral obligation towards animals? What is an animal? Certainly, most humans would think of these small rabbits as animals that deserve our protection. But, do humans generally consider that mosquitoes, spiders, or ticks deserve the same protection? Probably not. They are not ―fubsy‖; the term used to describe the cuddly soft, furry, larger mammals that we generally fawn over and feel the desire to protect. Recognizing this intrinsic tendency and attempting to override it, let us then define animals as any non-human organism. Yet, this is such a wide definition that it could pertain to potential aliens. Will we witness an Alien Rights movement soon? We are then forced to narrow our field to nonhuman organisms that remind us of humans and, thus, provoke empathy in us. However, to most advocates this would seem rather unsatisfactory because it is not ―fair‖.Historically, philosophers like Kant (and Descartes, Malebranche and even Aquinas) did not favor the idea of animal rights. They said that animals are the organic equivalents of machines, moved by coarse instincts, unable to experience pain (though their behavior sometimes might deceive us into mistakenly believing that they do). Thus, any moral obligation that we have towards animals is a derivative of a primary obligation, which we have towards our fellow humans. Empathy as a differentiating principle is of little use because it is primarily structural. If the animal looks like me, resembles me, behaves like me — then he must be like me in other, more profound ways. However, this is a faulty method when used to prove identity; empathy is defined in the dictionary as pathetic fallacy. The method is too dependent upon historical, cultural, and personal contexts. That another organism looks like us, behaves like us and talks like us is no guarantee that it is like us. The creature is not capable of want, and if it were, it would neither necessarily want nor deserve our pity. We cannot determine whether another creature, like another human, is experiencing pain, through empathy. Additionally, pain is a value judgment and the reaction to it is not only relative, but also culturally dependent. In some cases, it can actually be perceived as positive, and be sought after. If we, humans, cannot agree and separate the objective from the subjective, the rational from the cultural — what gives us the right to decide for other organisms (without getting their approval)? We cannot decide right and wrong, good and evil for those with whom communication is barred1. The author implies that an animal does not:

A. have enough ‗fubsy‘ characteristics to be considered human.
B. communicate effectively.
C. benefit from human empathy.
D. empathize with humans. .
E. deserve human sympathyIt has been said that animal experimenters ―are using more and more animals whom they consider less ‗cute‘, because, although they know these animals suffer just as much, they believe people won‘t object as strenuously to the torture of a pig or a rat as they will to that of a dog or a rabbit‖. The author would probably disagree by saying that:

A. dogs and rabbits are less ―cute‖ than pigs or rats.
B. people will usually object strenuously to an experiment in which any kind of animal is suffering.
C. the experimenters cannot know how much the animals suffer.
D. the experimenters probably realize that non-human organisms cannot suffer as we do.
E. there should be no discrimination on the basis of ‗cuteness‘