Candy is trying to decide between two job offers. the compensation package for job a includes a $300 per-month health insurance plan, to which candy would contribute $95; a $40 per-month life insurance plan; a salary of $65000 per year; and a 5% match on 401(k) contributions. the compensation package for job b includes a $400 per-month health insurance plan, to which candy would contribute $105; a $50 per-month life insurance plan; a salary of $64000 per year; and a 9% match on 401(k) contributions. candy plans to contribute $8000 per year to her 401(k) plan, what is the yearly value of health insurance benefit from job a? how about the yearly value of the health insurance benefit from job b?

Allie and sarah decided that they want to purchase renters insurance for the apartment they share. they made a list of all of the items to be covered by the insurance policy, along with their estimated values. if the items to be covered total more than $3000, the insurance company charges an annual premium of 23% of the total value of the items. if the items to be covered total $3000 or less, the insurance company charges an annual premium of 20% of the total value of the items.

This problem has been solved! see the answerwhich of the following statements is correct? the consumer price index is a measure of the overall level of prices, whereas the gdp deflator is not a measure of the overall level of prices. if, in the year 2011, the consumer price index has a value of 123.50, then the inflation rate for 2011 must be 23.50 percent. compared to the gdp deflator, the consumer price index is the more common gauge of inflation. the consumer price index and the gdp deflator reflect the goods and services bought by consumers equally well.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?