What are some ways panera bread earns the trust of its public?

Consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output q1. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes q1 and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p = 100 - q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals q1 +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of q1 and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses q1 first and firm 2 observes q1 and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-? 1 and ? 2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of q1 would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of q1? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f > 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q1, denoted by q1b, as a function of f. next, derive the expression for firm 1

Your uncle is considering investing in a new company that will produce high quality stereo speakers. the sales price would be set at 1.5 times the variable cost per unit; the variable cost per unit is estimated to be $75.00; and fixed costs are estimated at $1,200,000. what sales volume would be required to break even, i. e., to have ebit = zero?

How much are you willing to pay for a zero that matures in 10 years, has a face value of $1,000 and your required rate of return is 7%? round to the nearest cent. do not include a dollar sign in your answer. (i. e. if your answer is $432.51, then type 432.51 without $ sign)