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Nellie lumpkin, who suffered from dementia, was admitted to the picayune convalescent center, a nursing home. because of her mental condition, her daughter, beverly mcdaniel, signed the admissions agreement. it included a clause requiring the par- ties to submit any dispute to arbitration. after lumpkin left the center two years later, she filed a suit against picayune to recover damages for mistreatment and malpractice. [covenant health & rehabilitation of picayune, lp v. lumpkin, 23 so.2d 1092 (miss. app. 2009)] (see page 91.) 1. is it ethical for this dispute—involving negligent medical care, not a breach of a commercial contract—to be forced into arbitration? why or why not? discuss whether medical facilities should be able to impose arbitration when there is generally no bargaining over such terms.

Popeye produces 20 cans of spinach in 8 hours. wimpy produces 15 hamburgers in 10 hours. if each hamburger trades for 1.5 cans of spinach, then: a. wimpy’s production and productivity are greater than popeye’s. b. popeye’s production is greater than wimpy’s, but his productivity is less. c. wimpy’s production is greater than popeye’s, but his productivity is less. d. popeye’s production and productivity are greater than wimpy’s.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?