At Luis' company, employees' tasks are not very clear and employees tend to be stressed out. Which leadership behavior does path-goal theory say that Luis' boss should use due to the conditions of this workplace?

Price and efficiency variances, journal entries. the schuyler corporation manufactures lamps. it has set up the following standards per finished unit for direct materials and direct manufacturing labor: direct materials: 10 lb. at $4.50 per lb. $45.00 direct manufacturing labor: 0.5 hour at $30 per hour 15.00 the number of finished units budgeted for january 2017 was 10,000; 9,850 units were actually produced. actual results in january 2017 were as follows: direct materials: 98,055 lb. used direct manufacturing labor: 4,900 hours $154,350 assume that there was no beginning inventory of either direct materials or finished units. during the month, materials purchased amounted to 100,000 lb., at a total cost of $465,000. input price variances are isolated upon purchase. input-efficiency variances are isolated at the time of usage. 1. compute the january 2017 price and efficiency variances of direct materials and direct manufacturing labor. 2. prepare journal entries to record the variances in requirement 1. 3. comment on the january 2017 price and efficiency variances of schuyler corporation. 4. why might schuyler calculate direct materials price variances and direct materials efficiency variances with reference to different points in time

An allergy products superstore buys 6000 of their most popular model of air filters each year. the price of the air filters is $18. the cost of ordering and receiving shipments is $12 per order. accounting estimates annual carrying costs are 20% of the price. the supplier lead time is 2 days. the store operates 240 days per year. each order is received from the supplier in a single delivery. there are no quantity discounts. what is the store’s minimum total annual cost of placing orders & carrying inventory?

Why is the cournot equilibrium an​ equilibrium? a. there are​ short-run barriers to exit in a cournot​ duopoly, so both firms cannot alter their output levels. b. given the other​ firm's level of​ production, both firms are maximizing profits and cannot improve their situation by unilaterally altering their level of output. c. both firms operate at zero profit under a cournot​ equilibrium, so they would face negative profits if they change output. d. both firms operate at minimum​ long-run average cost under a cournot​ equilibrium, so changes to output would reduce​ long-run profits. even if they​ can't collude, why​ don't firms set their outputs at the joint​ profit-maximizing levels​ (i. e., the levels they would have chosen had they​ colluded)? a. given that other firm produces at the collusive​ level, a firm could increase their own profits by increasing output above the collusive level. b. the midpoint of the collusion curve​ (i. e., the collusive​ outcome) lies below the reaction​ curves, so both firms have an incentive to increase output under the cournot duopoly. c. both a and b are correct d. both a and b are incorrect