Week 1: Roles and Responsibilities in the Procurement Cycle According to the PMBOK® Guide, the project procurement cycle consists of processes: Plan Procurement Management, Conduct Procurements, and Control Procurements.

Explain the project procurement cycle (Plan, Conduct, and Control).
Explain the roles and responsibilities of individuals in each part of the project procurement cycle.

Aresearcher developing scanners to search for hidden weapons at airports has concluded that a new scanner isis significantly better than the current scanner. he made his decision based on a test using alpha equals 0.025 .α=0.025. would he have made the same decision at alpha equals 0.10 question mark α=0.10? how about alpha equals 0.01 question mark α=0.01? explain

Assume a competitive firm faces a market price of $60, a cost curve of c = 0.003q^3 + 25q + 750, and a marginal cost of curve of: mc = 0.009q^2 + 25.the firm's profit maximizing output level (to the nearest tenth) is , and the profit (to the nearest penny) at this output level is $ will cause the market supply to (shift right/shift left). this will continue until the price is equal to the minimum average cost of $

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?