What campaigns require manual tags on destination urls for tracking?

In year 1, the bennetts' 25-year-old daughter, jane, is a full-time student at an out-of-state university but she plans to return home after the school year ends. in previous years, jane has never worked and her parents have always been able to claim her as a dependent. in year 1, a kind neighbor offers to pay for all of jane's educational and living expenses. which of the following statements is most accurate regarding whether jane's parents would be allowed to claim an exemption for jane in year 1 assuming the neighbor pays for all of jane's support? a. no, jane must include her neighbor's gift as income and thus fails the gross income test for a qualifying relative. b.yes, because she is a full-time student and does not provide more than half of her own support, jane is considered her parent's qualifying child. c.no, jane is too old to be considered a qualifying child and fails the support test of a qualifying relative. d.yes, because she is a student, her absence is considered as "temporary." consequently she meets the residence test and is a considered a qualifying child of the bennetts.

Pederson company reported the following: manufacturing costs $480,000 units manufactured 8,000 units sold 7,500 units sold for $90 per unit beginning inventory 2,000 units what is the average manufacturing cost per unit? (round the answer to the nearest dollar.)

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?