Mexico and the members of OPEC produce crude oil. Realizing that it would be in their best interests to form an agreement on production goals, a meeting is arranged and an informal, verbal agreement is reached. If both Mexico and OPEC stick to the agreement OPEC will earn profits of $200 million and Mexico will earn profits of $100 million. If both Mexico and OPEC cheat then OPEC will earn $175 million and Mexico will earn $80 million. If only OPEC cheats, then OPEC earns $185 million and Mexico $60 million. If only Mexico cheats, then Mexico earns $110 million and OPEC $150million. OPEC
Cheat Abide
Cheat
Mexico Abide
Fill in the chart.
Does Mexico have a dominant strategy? If so, what is it?
Does OPEC have a dominant strategy? If so, what is it?
Is there a Nash equilibrium? If so, what is it?
Is this game an example of a prisoner’s dilemma? Why or why not?

Special order carson manufacturing, inc., sells a single product for $36 per unit. at an operating level of 8,000 units, variable costs are $18 per unit and fixed costs $10 per unit. carson has been offered a price of $20 per unit on a special order of 2,000 units by big mart discount stores, which would use its own brand name on the item. if carson accepts the order, material cost will be $3 less per unit than for regular production. however, special stamping equipment costing $4,000 would be needed to process the order; the equipment would then be discarded. assuming that volume remains within the relevant range, prepare an analysis of differential revenue and costs to determine whether carson should accept the special order. use a negative sign with answer to only indicate an income loss from special order; otherwise do not use negative signs with your answers.