Hi, im very b0red lol

Consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output q1. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes q1 and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p = 100 - q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals q1 +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of q1 and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses q1 first and firm 2 observes q1 and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-? 1 and ? 2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of q1 would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of q1? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f > 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q1, denoted by q1b, as a function of f. next, derive the expression for firm 1

King fisher aviation is evaluating an investment project with the following case flows: $6,000 $5,500 $7,000 $8,000 discount rate 14 percent what is the discounted payback period for these cash flows if the initial cost is 15,000? what if the initial cost is $12,000? what if the cost is $16,000?

If the government is required to balance the budget and the economy falls into a recession, which of the actions is a feasible policy response? cut taxes to encourage consumer spending invest in infrastructure increase government spending to stimulate the economy cut spending equal to the reduction in tax revenue what is a likely consequence of this policy? unemployment falls due to the economic stimulus. the negative consequences of the recession are magnified. consumer spending increases due to their ability to keep more of their after-tax income. there is hyperinflation due to an increase in aggregate demand.