This department administers the food stamp program which provides coupons to needy families to increase their food purchasing power.

Ashare stock is a small piece of ownership in a company ture or false

For each of the following cases determine the ending balance in the inventory account. (hint: first, determine the total cost of inventory available for sale. next, subtract the cost of the inventory sold to arrive at the ending balance.)a. jill’s dress shop had a beginning balance in its inventory account of $40,000. during the accounting period jill’s purchased $75,000 of inventory, returned $5,000 of inventory, and obtained $750 of purchases discounts. jill’s incurred $1,000 of transportation-in cost and $600 of transportation-out cost. salaries of sales personnel amounted to $31,000. administrative expenses amounted to $35,600. cost of goods sold amounted to $82,300.b. ken’s bait shop had a beginning balance in its inventory account of $8,000. during the accounting period ken’s purchased $36,900 of inventory, obtained $1,200 of purchases allowances, and received $360 of purchases discounts. sales discounts amounted to $640. ken’s incurred $900 of transportation-in cost and $260 of transportation-out cost. selling and administrative cost amounted to $12,300. cost of goods sold amounted to $33,900.a& b. cost of goods avaliable for sale? ending inventory?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?