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Business, 22.06.2019 15:30, TerronRice
In 2015, lori assigned a paid-up whole life insurance policy to an irrevocable life insurance trust (ilit) for the benefit of her three children. the ilit contained a crummey provision for the benefit of each child. at the time of the transfer, the whole life insurance policy was valued at $200,000, and since lori had not made any other taxable gifts during her lifetime, she did not owe any gift tax. lori died in 2016, and the face value of the whole life insurance policy of $2,000,000 was paid to the ilit. regarding this transfer, how much is included in lori’s gross estate at her death?
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Business, 22.06.2019 19:00, xojade
1. what must one do to perform the essential managerial task of controlling in achieving organizational goals? a. motivate, coordinate, and energize individuals and groups to work together to achieve organizational goals b. choose appropriate organizational goals and courses of action to best achieve those goals c. establish task and authority relationships that allow people to work together to achieve organizational goals d. establish accurate measuring and monitoring systems to evaluate how well the organization has achieved its goals
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Business, 23.06.2019 00:00, silonis21
1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?
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