Account
debit
debit
credit
credit
merchandise inventory, 7/1/15
32,000
sales
380,000
sales returns
12,000
purchases
240,000
purchase discounts
6,000
purchase returns
1
exercise 8-3 determining cost of goods sold; periodic inventory system [lo8-1]
askew company uses a periodic inventory system. the june 30, 2016, year-end trial balance for the company contained the following information:
account
debit
debit
credit
credit
merchandise inventory, 7/1/15
32,000
sales
380,000
sales returns
12,000
purchases
240,000
purchase discounts
6,000
purchase returns
10,000
freight-in
17,000
in addition, you determine that the june 30, 2016, inventory balance is $40,000.
required:
1.
calculate the cost of goods sold for the askew company for the year ending june 30, 2016.
2.
prepare the year-end adjusting entry to record cost of goods sold. (if no entry is required for a transaction/event, select "no journal entry required" in the first account field.)

At cooly cola, we are testing the appeal of our new diet one cola. in a taste test of 250 randomly chosen cola drinkers, 200 consumers preferred diet one cola to the leading brand. assuming that the sample were large enough, the large-sample 95% confidence interval for the population proportion of cola drinkers that prefer diet one cola would be:

Which of the following best explains why the demand for housing is more flexible than the supply? a. new housing developments are being constructed all the time. b. low interest rates for mortgages make buying a home very affordable. c. the increasing population always drives demand upwards. d. people can move more easily than producers can build new homes.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?