ti 84 CalJuice Company has decided to introduce three fruit juices made from blending two or more concentrates. These juices will be packaged in 2-qt (64-oz) cartons. One carton of pineapple-orange juice requires 8 oz each of pineapple and orange juice concentrates. One carton of orange-banana juice requires 12 oz of orange juice concentrate and 4 oz of banana pulp concentrate. Finally, one carton of pineapple-orange-banana juice requires 4 oz of pineapple juice concentrate, 8 oz of orange juice concentrate, and 4 oz of banana pulp concentrate. The company has decided to allot 16,000 oz of pineapple juice concentrate, 24,000 oz of orange juice concentrate, and 5000 oz of banana pulp concentrate for the initial production run. The company also stipulated that the production of pineapple-orange-banana juice should not exceed 740 cartons. Its profit on one carton of pineapple-orange juice is $1.00 , its profit on one carton of orange-banana juice is $0.80 , and its profit on one carton of pineapple-orange-banana juice is $0.90 . To realize a maximum profit, how many cartons of each blend should the company produce

The impact fiscal multiplier is a. usually estimated to have an average value of 2. b. usually estimated to have an average value of 0. c. the actual immediate multiplier effect of a fiscal policy action after taking into consideration direct fiscal offsets and other short-term crowding out of private spending. d. the multiplier effect of a fiscal policy action that applies to a long-run period after all influences on equilibrium real gdp have been taken into account.

Your sister turned 35 today, and she is planning to save $60,000 per year for retirement, with the first deposit to be made one year from today. she will invest in a mutual fund that's expected to provide a return of 7.5% per year. she plans to retire 30 years from today, when she turns 65, and she expects to live for 25 years after retirement, to age 90. under these assumptions, how much can she spend each year after she retires? her first withdrawal will be made at the end of her first retirement year.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?