Why might a bank restrict a customers ability to access funds from a deposited check for several days A. The bank wishes to make sure the check-writer actually has sufficient funds in her account to cover the check.

B. The check must be verified by the U. S territory

C. The restriction protects people from making impulse purchases

D. Banks only allow one withdrawal per week.

Double corporation acquired all of the common stock of simple company for

Haley photocopying purchases a paper from an out-of-state vendor. average weekly demand for paper is 150 cartons per week for which haley pays $15 per carton. in bound shipments from the vendor average 1000 cartoons with an average lead time of 3 weeks. haley operates 52 weeks per year; it carries a 4-week supply of inventory as safety stock and no anticipation inventory. the vendor has recently announced that they will be building a faculty near haley photocopying that will reduce lead time to one week. further, they will be able to reduce shipments to 200 cartons. haley believes that they will be able to reduce safety stock to a 1-week supply. what impact will these changes make to haley’s average inventory level and its average aggregated inventory value?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?