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Management discovers that a supervisor at one of its restaurant locations removes excess cash and resets sales totals throughout the day on the point-of-sale (pos) system. at closing, the supervisor deposits cash equal to the recorded sales on the pos system and keeps the rest. the supervisor forwards the close-of-day pos reports from the pos system along with a copy of the bank deposit slip to the company’s revenue accounting department. the revenue accounting department records the sales and the cash for the location in the general ledger and verifies the deposit slip to the bank statement. any differences between sales and deposits are recorded in an over/short account and, if necessary, followed up with the location supervisor. the customer food order checks are serially numbered, and it is the supervisor’s responsibility to see that they are accounted for at the end of each day. customerchecks and the transaction journal tapes from the pos system are kept by the supervisor for 1 week at the location and then destroyed. what control allowed the fraud to occur?

Blank is the internal operation that arranges information resources to support business performance and outcomes

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?