Venture capital (VC) firms are pools of private capital that typically invest in small, fast-growing companies, which usually can’t raise funds through other means. In exchange for this financing, the VCs receive a share of the company’s equity, and the founders of the firm typically stay on and continue to manage the company. a. Describe the nature of the incentive conflict between VCs and the managers, identifying the principal and the agent.
b. VC investments have two typical components:
(1) managers maintain some ownership in the company and often earn additional equity if the company performs well;
(2) VCs demand seats on the company’s board. Discuss how these two components help address the incentive conflict.

For example, the upper right cell shows that if expresso advertises and beantown doesn't advertise, expresso will make a profit of $15 million, and beantown will make a profit of $2 million. assume this is a simultaneous game and that expresso and beantown are both profit-maximizing firms. if expresso decides to advertise, it will earn a profit of $ million if beantown advertises and a profit of $ million if beantown does not advertise. if expresso decides not to advertise, it will earn a profit of $ million if beantown advertises and a profit of $ million if beantown does not advertise. if beantown advertises, expresso makes a higher profit if it chooses . if beantown doesn't advertise, expresso makes a higher profit if it chooses . suppose that both firms start off not advertising. if the firms act independently, what strategies will they end up choosing? expresso will choose to advertise and beantown will choose not to advertise. expresso will choose not to advertise and beantown will choose to advertise. both firms will choose to advertise. both firms will choose not to advertise.