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Business, 13.01.2021 17:40 alevans7144

c. Suppose that the total amount to be paid under the contract with the city is estimated at $14,000 but may be adjusted to $12,000 next year during the review of the city budget. What amount from the contract, if any, should Brown Thumb recognize as income this year

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c. Suppose that the total amount to be paid under the contract with the city is estimated at $14,000...

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