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Benton company (bc), a calendar year entity, has one owner, who is in the 37% federal income tax bracket (any net capital gains or dividends would be taxed at a 20% rate). bc's gross income is $395,000, and its ordinary trade or business deductions are $245,000. ignore the standard deduction (or itemized deductions) and the deduction for qualified business income. if required, round computations to the nearest dollar. a. bc is operated as a proprietorship, and the owner withdraws $100,000 for personal use. bc's taxable income for the current year is $ , and the tax liability associated with the income from the sole proprietorship is $ . b. bc is operated as a c corporation, pays out $100,000 as salary, and pays no dividends to its shareholder. bc's taxable income for the current year is $ , and bc's tax liability is $ . the shareholder's tax liability is $ . c. bc is operated as a c corporation and pays out no salary or dividends to its shareholder. bc's taxable income for the current year is $ , and bc's tax liability is $ . d. bc is operated as a c corporation, pays out $100,000 as salary, and pays out the remainder of its earnings as dividends. bc's taxable income for the current year is $ , and bc's tax liability is $ .

You are evaluating two different silicon wafer milling machines. the techron i costs $285,000, has a three-year life, and has pretax operating costs of $78,000 per year. the techron ii costs $495,000, has a five-year life, and has pretax operating costs of $45,000 per year. for both milling machines, use straight-line depreciation to zero over the project’s life and assume a salvage value of $55,000. if your tax rate is 24 percent and your discount rate is 11 percent, compute the eac for both machines.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?