assets and costs will change in line with sales and debt and equity will not. assume that no dividends are paid and next years sales are projected to be 5970. what is the external financing needed

Marketing1. suppose the average price for a new disposable cell phone is $20, and the total market potential for that product is $4 million. topco, inc. has a planned market share of 10 percent. how many phones does topco have the potential to sell in this market? 20,0002. use the data from question 3 to calculate topco, inc.'s planned market share in dollars. $400,0003. atlantic car rental charges $29.95 per day to rent a mid-size automobile. pacific car rental, atlantic's main competitor, just reduced prices on all its car rentals. in response, atlantic reduced its prices by 5 percent. now how much does it cost to rent a mid-size automobile from atlantic? $28.45

Clooney corp. establishes a petty cash fund for $225 and issues a credit card to its office manager. by the end of the month, employees made one expenditure from the petty cash fund (entertainment, $20) and three expenditures with the credit card (postage, $59; delivery, $84; supplies expense, $49).record all employee expenditures, and record the entry to replenish the petty cash fund. the credit card balance will be paid later. (if no entry is required for a transaction/event, select "no journal entry required" in the first account record expenditures from credit card and the petty cash fund.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?