Business, 27.08.2020 01:01 Lhuckabee

Jenna receives a job offer

Answers: 3

Show answers

Other questions on the subject: Business

Business, 22.06.2019 10:50, jadeafrias

You are evaluating two different silicon wafer milling machines. the techron i costs $285,000, has a three-year life, and has pretax operating costs of $78,000 per year. the techron ii costs $495,000, has a five-year life, and has pretax operating costs of $45,000 per year. for both milling machines, use straight-line depreciation to zero over the project’s life and assume a salvage value of $55,000. if your tax rate is 24 percent and your discount rate is 11 percent, compute the eac for both machines.

Answers: 3

continue

Business, 22.06.2019 13:30, ayoismeisalex

On january 2, well co. purchased 10% of rea, inc.’s outstanding common shares for $400,000, which equaled the carrying amount and the fair value of the interest purchased in rea’s net assets. well did not elect the fair value option. because well is the largest single shareholder in rea, and well’s officers are a majority on rea’s board of directors, well exercises significant influence over rea. rea reported net income of $500,000 for the year and paid dividends of $150,000. in its december 31 balance sheet, what amount should well report as investment in rea?

Answers: 3

continue

Business, 22.06.2019 20:30, whitems33982

When many scrum teams are working on the same product, should all of their increments be integrated every sprint?

Answers: 3

continue

Business, 23.06.2019 00:00, silonis21

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?

Answers: 3

continue

You know the right answer?

Jenna receives a job offer...