Flychucker Corporation is evaluating an extra dividend versus a share repurchase. In either case $20,000 would be spent. Current earnings are $2.00 per share, and the stock currently sells for $50 per share. There are 2,500 shares outstanding. Ignore taxes and other imperfections. a. Evaluate the two alternatives in terms of the effect on the price per share of the stock and shareholder wealth per share. (Do not round intermediate calculations and round your answers to 2 decimal places, e. g., 32.16.)
Alternative I Extra dividend
Price per share $
Shareholder wealth $
Alternative II Repurchase
Price per share $
Shareholder wealth $
b. What will be the effect on the company’s EPS and PE ratio under the two different scenarios? (Do not round intermediate calculations and round your answers to 2 decimal places, e. g., 32.16.)
Cash dividend
EPS $
PE ratio
Share repurchase
EPS $
PE ratio

Which ranks these careers that employers are most likely to hire from the least to the greatest?

> > objectives define federalism and explain why the framers adopted a federal system instead of a unitary system. categorize powers delegated to and denied to the national government, and powers reserved for and denied to the states, and the difference between exclusive and concurrent powers.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?