Consider an antique auction where bidders have independent private values. There are two bidders, each of whom perceives that valuations are uniformly distributed between $100 and $1,000. One of the bidders is Sue, who knows her own valuation is $200. What is Sue's optimal bidding strategy in a first-price, sealed-bid auction? A) Submit a bid of $150. B) Submit a bid of $200. C) Submit a bid that is less than $150. D) Yell "mine" when the bid reaches $150.

A) Submit a bid of $150.

Explanation:

In a first-price sealed auction, the bidders do not know their competitors' bids and the highest blind bid takes the prize. In this type of bidding, yelling "mine" is not an option. As for the value, if Sue values the antique at $200, in order to gain from the transaction, she should bid less than $200.

The optimal bidding for a neutral risk taker is given by:

Where 'v' is Sue's valuation, 'n' is the number of bidders, and 'L' is the lowest possible value:

Sue's optimal bidding strategy is A) Submit a bid of $150.

match the scenarios with terms related to financial aid.

pell grant

student loan

merit-based scholarship

richard is one of the leading college basketball players in the state of florida. he also maintains a good academic record. looking at his talent and potential, furman university offers to bear the expenses for his college education.

arrowright

anita wants to pursue a certificate program in sports nutrition. to pay for the course, she borrows money by filing the fafsa.

arrowright

nathan comes from a low-income household. he wants to pursue an undergraduate degree in marketing. he receives financial aid covering 50 percent of his college expenses. nathan does not have to pay back this amount.

arrowright