Police Corporation acquired 100 percent of Station Corporation's voting shares on January 1, 20X3, at underlying book value. At that date, the book values and fair values of Station's assets and liabilities were equal. Police uses the equity method in accounting for its investment in Station. Adjusted trial balances for Police and Station on December 31, 20X3, are as follows: Station Corporation Debit Credit $ 105,000 225,000 Item Current Assets Depreciable Assets (net) Investment in Station Corporation Depreciation Expense Other Expenses Dividends Declared Current Liabilities Long-Term Debt Common Stock Retained Earnings Sales Income from Station Corporation Police Corporation Debit Credit $ 145,000 325,000 170,000 25,000 105,000 40,000 $ 50,000 100,000 200,000 230,000 200,000 30,000 $ 810,000 $ 810,000 15,000 75,000 10,000 $ 40,000 120,000 100,000 50,000 120,000 $430,000 $430,000
Required:
Prepare the basic consolidation entry required on December 31, 20X3, to prepare consolidated financial statements. (If no entry is required for a transaction/event, select "No journal entry required" in the first account field.)

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?