Assume the spot rate on the Canadian dollar is C$1.1847. The risk-free nominal rate in the U. S. is 5 percent while it is only 4 percent in Canada. What one-year forward rate will create interest rate parity?

Garrett is an executive vice president at samm hardware. he researches a proposal by a larger company, maximum hardware, to combine the two companies. by analyzing past performance, conducting focus groups, and interviewing maximum employees, garrett concludes that maximum has poor profit margins, sells shoddy merchandise, and treats customers poorly. what actions should garrett and samm hardware take? a. turn down the acquisition offer and prepare to resist a hostile takeover. b. attempt a friendly merger and use managerial hubris to improve results at maximum. c. welcome the acquisition and use knowledge transfer to impart sam hardware's management practices. d. do nothing; the two companies cannot combine without samm hardware's explicit consent.

Phoenix guitars is interested in pursuing backward integration to take greater ownership of the extraction of raw materials and production of components used in its signature line of guitars. although this approach would lower the overall cost of producing a guitar, the costs associated with producing electronic pickupsfor sound amplification are far greater than those associated with sourcing pickups from a reliable supplier. which of the following approaches is likely to produce superior results? a) invest in vertical integration despite the cost of producing pickups. b) abandon the idea of vertical integration entirely. c) pursue taper integration. d) introduce a budget line of guitars to diversify the firm's offerings.

Why is the cournot equilibrium an​ equilibrium? a. there are​ short-run barriers to exit in a cournot​ duopoly, so both firms cannot alter their output levels. b. given the other​ firm's level of​ production, both firms are maximizing profits and cannot improve their situation by unilaterally altering their level of output. c. both firms operate at zero profit under a cournot​ equilibrium, so they would face negative profits if they change output. d. both firms operate at minimum​ long-run average cost under a cournot​ equilibrium, so changes to output would reduce​ long-run profits. even if they​ can't collude, why​ don't firms set their outputs at the joint​ profit-maximizing levels​ (i. e., the levels they would have chosen had they​ colluded)? a. given that other firm produces at the collusive​ level, a firm could increase their own profits by increasing output above the collusive level. b. the midpoint of the collusion curve​ (i. e., the collusive​ outcome) lies below the reaction​ curves, so both firms have an incentive to increase output under the cournot duopoly. c. both a and b are correct d. both a and b are incorrect