Which of the following is NOT on a credit report Late medical payments

Repayment history

Buying habits

Public records

Reqwest llc agrees to sell one hundred servers to social media networks, inc. the servers, which social media networks expressly requires to have certain amounts of memory, are to be shipped “f. o.b. social media networks distribution center in tampa, fl.” when the servers arrive, social media networks rejects them and informs reqwest, claiming that the servers do not conform to social media networks’ memory requirement. a few hours later, the servers are destroyed in a fire at social media networks’ distribution center. will reqwest succeed in a suit against social media networks for the cost of the goods?

When cell phones were first entering the market, they were relatively large and reception was undependable. all cell phones were essentially the same. but as the technology developed, many competitors entered, introducing features unique to their phones. today, cell phones are only a small fraction of the size and weight of their predecessors. consumers can buy cell phones with color screens, cameras, internet access, daily planners, or voice activation (and any combination of these features). the history of the cell phone demonstrates what marketing trend?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?