The purpose of building human connection would ba a part of Starbucks

Two assets have the following expected returns and standard deviations when the risk-free rate is 5%: asset a e(ra) = 18.5% σa = 20% asset b e(rb) = 15% σb = 27% an investor with a risk aversion of a = 3 would find that on a risk-return basis. a. only asset a is acceptable b. only asset b is acceptable c. neither asset a nor asset b is acceptable d. both asset a and asset b are acceptable

This exercise illustrates that poor quality can affect schedules and costs. a manufacturing process has 130 customer orders to fill. each order requires one component part that is purchased from a supplier. however, typically, 3% of the components are identified as defective, and the components can be assumed to be independent. (a) if the manufacturer stocks 130 components, what is the probability that the 130 orders can be filled without reordering components? (b) if the manufacturer stocks 132 components, what is the probability that the 130 orders can be filled without reordering components? (c) if the manufacturer stocks 135 components, what is the probability that the 130 orders can be filled without reordering components?

Suppose that two firms produce differentiated products and compete in prices. as in class, the two firms are located at two ends of a line one mile apart. consumers are evenly distributed along the line. the firms have identical marginal cost, $60. firm b produces a product with value $110 to consumers. firm a (located at 0 on the unit line) produces a higher quality product with value $120 to consumers. the cost of travel are directly related to the distance a consumer travels to purchase a good. if a consumerhas to travel a mile to purchase a good, the incur a cost of $20. if they have to travel x fraction of a mile, they incur a cost of $20x. (a) write down the expressions for how much a consumer at location d would value the products sold by firms a and b, if they set prices p_{a} and p_{b} ? (b) based on your expressions in (a), how much will be demanded from each firm if prices p_{a} and p_{b} are set? (c) what are the nash equilibrium prices?