Prepare journal entries to record each of the following four separate issuances of stock. A corporation issued 4,000 shares of $5 par value common stock for $35,000 cash. A corporation issued 2,000 shares of no-par common stock to its promoters in exchange for their efforts, estimated to be worth $40,000. The stock has a $1 per share stated value. A corporation issued 2,000 shares of no-par common stock to its promoters in exchange for their efforts, estimated to be worth $40,000. The stock has no stated value. A corporation issued 1,000 shares of $50 par value preferred stock for $60,000 cash.

Beswick company your team is allocated a project involving a major client, the beswick company. although the organization has many clients, this client, and project, is the largest source of revenue and affects the work of several other teams in the organization. the project requires continuous involvement with the client, so any problems with the client are immediately felt by others in the organization. jamie, a member of your team, is the only person in the company with whom this client is willing to deal. it can be said that jamie has:

Suppose the marginal damage and marginal benefit curves in a polluted neighborhood are md = p/3 and mb = 4 – p. also, suppose that transactions costs are low, so that the consumers and the firm can bargain. we saw that in this case, the socially-optimal level of pollution is achieved. start by computing the socially-optimal p. then, for each of the following cases, compute the amount of money transferred through the bargaining process, and indicate who pays whom (i. e., whether consumers pay the firm, or vice versa). also, compute the gains to each party relative to the status quo (i. e., the starting point of the bargaining process).a)consumers have the right to clean air; firm is dominant in the bargaining process. b)consumers have the right to clean air; consumers are dominant in the bargaining process. c)firm has the right to pollute; firm is dominant in the bargaining process. d)firm has the right to pollute; consumers are dominant in the bargaining proces

Using a cps-sample of 7,440 individuals, you estimate the following regression: = 20.91 - 2.61 x female where female is a binary variable that takes on the value of 1 for females and is 0 otherwise. the standard error on the coefficient on female is 0.25. the 95% confidence interval for the gender wage gap, or the amount that females earn less, is: a) [-3.10, -2.12] b) [18.30, 23.52] c) [-3.02, -2.20] d) [-1.96, -1.64]