Which of the following is an explanation of the capture theory? A. When products have too many warning labels comma consumers may not read any of them. B. People who have been in an industry are most likely to be asked to be regulators of the industry. C. Regulators who are interested in keeping their jobs must please both the industry and consumers. D. In some markets, sellers have more information about products than buyers.

Acountry made education free in mandatory up to age 15. it is established 100 new schools to educate kids across the country. as a result, citizens acquired the _ required to work. the school's generated _ for teachers and other staff. in 20 years, to countryside rapid _ and its gdp.

Crowding out is a phenomenon focused upon most by the macroeconomists of whereby a government deficit interest rates, which in turn private investment spending. this group also believed that fiscal policy is the only thing that can lower natural unemployment. is just as effective in countering recessions as monetary policy. can be used most of the time, but monetary policy becomes a better option when velocity is fluctuating. should be used only if the central bank follows a monetary policy rule. faces problematic lags in propagating changes throughout the economy.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?