5. AD-AS Numerical Analysis (10 points). Assume that the long-run aggregate supply curve is vertical at Y = 3,000 while the short-run aggregate supply curve is horizontal at P = 1.0. The aggregate demand curve is Y = 2 × M / P, and M = 1,500. a. If the economy is initially in long-run equilibrium, what are the values of P and Y? (2 points) b. What is the velocity of money in this case? (2 points) c. Suppose because banks start paying interest on checking accounts, the aggregate demand function shifts to Y = 1.5 × M / P. What are the short-run values of P and Y? (2 points). d. What is the velocity of money in this case? (2 points) e. With the new aggregate demand function, once the economy adjusts to long-run equilibrium, what are P and Y? (2 points).

Suppose a stock had an initial price of $65 per share, paid a dividend of $1.45 per share during the year, and had an ending share price of $58. a, compute the percentage total return. (a negative answer should be indicated by a minus sign. do not round intermediate calculations and enter your answer as a percent rounded to 2 decimal places, e. g., 32.16.) b. what was the dividend yield and the capital gains yield? (a negative answer should be indicated by a minus sign. do not round intermediate calculations and enter your answers as a percent rounded to 2 decimal places, e. g., 32.16.)

Solomon chemical company makes three products, b7, k6, and x9, which are joint products from the same materials. in a standard batch of 320,000 pounds of raw materials, the company generates 70,000 pounds of b7, 150,000 pounds of k6, and 100,000 pounds of x9. a standard batch costs $3,840,000 to produce. the sales prices per pound are $10, $14, and $20 for b7, k6, and x9, respectively. (a) allocate the joint product cost among the three final products using weight as the allocation base. (b) allocate the joint product cost among the three final products using market value as the allocation base. (c) allocate the joint product cost among the three final products using weight as the allocation base.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?