is a subset of an organization�s extranet designed to automate the business processes that occur before, during, and after sales transactions between the organization (i. e., a single buyer) and its multiple suppliers. Owned or managed by a "downstream" company and automate the business processes involved in purchasing or procuring products from multiple suppliers; they connect a single buyer and multiple suppliers

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This problem has been solved! see the answercompute and interpret altman's z-scoresfollowing is selected financial information for ebay, for its fiscal years 2005 and 2006.(in millions, except per share data) 2006 2005current assets $ 4,970.59 $ 3,183.24current liabilities 2,518.39 1,484.93total assets 13,494.01 11,788.99total liabilities 2,589.38 1,741.00shares outstanding 1,368.51 1,404.18retained earnings 4,538.35 2,819.64stock price per share 30.07 43.22sales 5,969.74 4,552.40earnings before interest and taxes 1,439.77 1,445.18compute and interpret altman z-scores for the company for both years. (do not round until your final answer; then round your answers to two decimal places.)2006 z-score = answer2005 z-score = answerwhich of the following best describes the company's likelihood to go bankrupt given the z-score in 2006 compared to 2007.the z-score in 2006 is half of the 2005 score. both z-scores are well above the score that represents a healthy company. the z-score in 2006 is double the 2005 score. the z-score has increased sharply, which suggests the company has greatly increased the risk of bankruptcy. the z-score in 2006 is half of the 2005 score. the z-score has decreased sharply, which suggests the company is in financial distress. the z-score in 2006 is double the 2005 score. the z-score has increased sharply, which suggests the company has greatly lowered the risk of bankruptcy.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?