An industry has 1000 competitive firms, each producing 50 tons of output. At the current market price of $10, half of the firms have a short-run supply curve with a slope of 1; the other half each have a short-run supply curve with slope 2. The short-run elasticity of market supply is:A) 1/50
B) 3/10
C) 1/5
D) 2/5
E) none of the above

Analyzing and computing accrued warranty liability and expense waymire company sells a motor that carries a 60-day unconditional warranty against product failure. from prior years' experience, waymire estimates that 2% of units sold each period will require repair at an average cost of $100 per unit. during the current period, waymire sold 69,000 units and repaired 1,000 units. (a) how much warranty expense must waymire report in its current period income statement? (b) what warranty liability related to current period sales will waymire report on its current period-end balance sheet? (hint: remember that some units were repaired in the current period.) (c) what analysis issues must we consider with respect to reported warranty liabilities?

Levine inc., which produces a single product, has prepared the following standard cost sheet for one unit of the product. direct materials (9 pounds at $1.80 per pound) $16.20 direct labor (6 hours at $14.00 per hour) $84.00 during the month of april, the company manufactures 270 units and incurs the following actual costs. direct materials purchased and used (2,500 pounds) $5,000 direct labor (1,660 hours) $22,908 compute the total, price, and quantity variances for materials and labor.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?