Suppose that your firm's current unlevered value, V*, is $800,000, and its marginal corporate tax rate is 35 percent. Also, you model the firm's PV of financial distress as a function of its debt level according to the relation: PV of financial distress = 800,000 × ((D/V*)^2). What is the firm's levered value if it issues $200,000 of perpetual debt to buy back stock?

Which of the following mechanisms would be most likely to motivate managers to act in the best interests of shareholders? a) decrease the use of restrictive covenants in bond agreements, b) take actions that reduce the possibility of a hostile takeover, c) elect a board of directors that allows managers greater freedom of action, d) increase the proportion of executive compensation that comes from stock options and reduce the proportion that is paid as cash salaries, e) eliminate a requirement that members of the board directors have a substantial investment in the firm's stocks

The rybczynski theorem describes: (a) how commodity price changes influence real factor rewards (b) how commodity price changes influence relative factor rewards. (c) how changes in factor endowments cause changes in commodity outputs. (d) how trade leads to factor price equalization.

There is a small, family-owned store that sells food and household goods in a small town. the owners have good relations with the community, especially with local farmers who supply much of the food. the farmers aren't organized into a cooperative or union, and the store deals with each individually. suppose the store wanted to buy some farms to control the supply of certain vegetables. how would you classify this strategic move? select one: a. horizontal integration b. forward integration c. backward integration d. concentric integration