A trucking business is considering whether to give up its local delivery routes or to expand its long haul (over 100 miles) operations. In this decision, the wage costs of the additional drivers that will have to be hired for the long haul operations can best be described as a(n):

Which of the following statements is correct? a) one drawback of forming a corporation is that it generally subjects the firm to additional regulationsb) one drawback of forming a corporation is that it subjects the firms investors to increased personal liabilitiesc) one drawback of forming a corporation is that it makes it more difficult for the firm to raise capitald) one advantage of forming a corporation is that it subjects the firm's investors to fewer taxese) one disadvantage of forming a corporation is that it is more difficult for the firm's investors to transfer their ownership interests

At the end of the week, carla receives her paycheck and goes directly to the bank after work to make a deposit into her savings account. the bank keeps the required reserve and then loans out the remaining balance to a qualified borrower named malik as a portion of his small business loan. malik uses the loan to buy a tractor for his construction business and makes small monthly payments to the bank to payback the principal balance plus interest on the loan. the bank profits from a portion of the interest payment received and also passes some of the interest back to carla in the form of an interest payment to her savings account. in this example, the bank is acting

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?