Assume that Matt, Joe, and Teresa are the only citizens in a community. A proposed public good has a total cost of $1,000. All three citizens will share an equal portion of this cost in taxes. The benefit of the public good is $500 for Matt, $280 for Joe, and $260 for Teresa. In a majority vote, this proposal will most likely be

Many potential buyers value high-quality used cars at the full-information market price of € p1 and lemons at € p2. a limited number of potential sellers value high-quality cars at € v1 ≤ p1 and lemons at € v2 ≤ p2. everyone is risk neutral. the share of lemons among all the used cars that might be potentially sold is € θ . suppose that the buyers incur a transaction cost of $200 to purchase a car. this transaction cost is the value of their time to find a car. what is the equilibrium? is it possible that no cars are sold