Professor Bai is worried about his job security, and has started to venture into a new startup. Perhaps surprisingly, he is able to take his startup to IPO within a 5-year period (please allow me to dream). The firm has just announced its first dividend of $3/share and the firm’s dividend is expected to grow extremely fast for 4 years in a row at 30% each year. However, Professor Bai expects that the company will only grow at 5% after that forever (Professor Bai is vampire and lives forever!!). Expected return (discount rate) for stocks is 12%. Please use the dividend discount model to price the stock at t=0.

Areal estate agent is considering changing her cell phone plan. there are three plans to choose from, all of which involve a monthly service charge of $20. plan a has a cost of $.42 a minute for daytime calls and $.17 a minute for evening calls. plan b has a charge of $.52 a minute for daytime calls and $.15 a minute for evening calls. plan c has a flat rate of $80 with 275 minutes of calls allowed per month and a charge of $.38 per minute beyond that, day or evening. a. determine the total charge under each plan for this case: 150 minutes of day calls and 70 minutes of evening calls in a month. (do not round intermediate calculations. round your answer to 2 decimal places. omit the "$" sign in your response.)c. if the agent will use the service for daytime calls, over what range of call minutes will each plan be optimal? (round each answer to the nearest whole number. include the indifference point itself in each answer.)d. suppose that the agent expects both daytime and evening calls. at what point (i. e., percentage of total call minutes used for daytime calls) would she be indifferent between plans a and b?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?

The notarial evidence form is completed by