Suppose the U. S. decided to use a quota to limit cell phone imports. Assume the U. S. is a small country. If the U. S. used an auction to allocate quota rights A. the U. S. welfare would be lower than it would be if the exporting countries used voluntary export restraints instead. B. the auction could generate revenue that was roughly equal to the revenue generated by a tariff which limited imports to the level allowed under the quota. C. the U. S. welfare would be higher than it would be if U. S. continued to have a free trade policy. D. the auction would generate much more revenue than would be generated by a tariff which limited imports to the level allowed under the quota.

Why is the cournot equilibrium an​ equilibrium? a. there are​ short-run barriers to exit in a cournot​ duopoly, so both firms cannot alter their output levels. b. given the other​ firm's level of​ production, both firms are maximizing profits and cannot improve their situation by unilaterally altering their level of output. c. both firms operate at zero profit under a cournot​ equilibrium, so they would face negative profits if they change output. d. both firms operate at minimum​ long-run average cost under a cournot​ equilibrium, so changes to output would reduce​ long-run profits. even if they​ can't collude, why​ don't firms set their outputs at the joint​ profit-maximizing levels​ (i. e., the levels they would have chosen had they​ colluded)? a. given that other firm produces at the collusive​ level, a firm could increase their own profits by increasing output above the collusive level. b. the midpoint of the collusion curve​ (i. e., the collusive​ outcome) lies below the reaction​ curves, so both firms have an incentive to increase output under the cournot duopoly. c. both a and b are correct d. both a and b are incorrect