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Business, 12.03.2020 01:32 kerra61

Wilbur does not like change. He thinks the cell phone he currently owns is just fine even though it doesn't have all the features of new phones on the market. Wilbur hopes that he doesn't lose this phone because the company doesn't make this style anymore and he doesn't want to get anything different. What type of adopter is Wilbur

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Wilbur does not like change. He thinks the cell phone he currently owns is just fine even though it...

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