Which of the following statements is true of absorption costing? A. It considers variable selling and administrative costs as product costs. B. It considers variable manufacturing overhead cost as period costs. C. It considers fixed manufacturing overhead cost as product costs. D. It considers fixed selling and administrative costs as product costs.

If springfield is operating at full employment who is working a. everyone b. about 96% of the workforce c. the entire work force d. the robots

Scoresby co. uses 6 machine hours and 2 direct labor hours to produce product x. it uses 8 machine hours and 16 direct labor hours to produce product y. scoresby's assembly and finishing departments have factory overhead rates of $240 per machine hour and $160 per direct labor hour, respectively. how much overhead cost will be charged to the two products? a. product x = $1,440; product y = $2,560 b. product x = $1,760; product y = $4,480 c. product x = $3,200; product y = $9,600 d. product x = $800; product y = $800

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?