A loaded barge is being towed by two tugboats and the magnitude of the resultant is 6000 pounds directed along the axis of the barge. Each tow line makes and angle of theta degrees with the axis of the barge. Write the resultant tension T of each tow line as a function of theta.

Faldo corp sells on terms that allow customers 45 days to pay for merchandise. its sales last year were $325,000, and its year-end receivables were $60,000. if its dso is less than the 45-day credit period, then customers are paying on time. otherwise, they are paying late. by how much are customers paying early or late? base your answer on this equation: dso - credit period = days early or late, and use a 365-day year when calculating the dso. a positive answer indicates late payments, while a negative answer indicates early payments. a. 21.27b. 22.38c. 23.50d. 24.68e. 25.91b

Assume a competitive firm faces a market price of $60, a cost curve of c = 0.003q^3 + 25q + 750, and a marginal cost of curve of: mc = 0.009q^2 + 25.the firm's profit maximizing output level (to the nearest tenth) is , and the profit (to the nearest penny) at this output level is $ will cause the market supply to (shift right/shift left). this will continue until the price is equal to the minimum average cost of $

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?