The economics class at 10 a. m. is the same as the supply of seats for the same class at but while every student who wants to attend this class at 12 noon can, not every student who wants that the demand for the 10 a. m. class supply of seats for an 2 noon, to attend the 10 a. m. class can. Tuition does not vary by time. It follows that the demand for the 10 a. m. class is the demand for the noon class. a. lower than b. the same as c. greater than d. either a or b e. none of the above

On analyzing her company’s goods transport route, simone found that they could reduce transport costs by a quarter if they merged different transport routes. what role (job) does simone play at her company? simone is at her company.

Afarmer is an example of what kind of producer?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?