A pension fund manager is considering three mutual funds. the first is a stock fund, the second is a long-term government and corporate bond fund, and the third is a t-bill money market fund that yields a rate of 6%. the probability distribution of the risky funds is as follows: expected return standard deviation stock fund (s) 21 % 28 % bond fund (b) 12 18 the correlation between the fund returns is 0.09. you require that your portfolio yield an expected return of 13%, and that it be efficient, on the best feasible cal.

a. what is the standard deviation of your portfolio? (round your answer to 2 decimal places.)

b. what is the proportion invested in the t-bill fund and each of the two risky funds? (round your answers to 2 decimal places.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?