On December 31 of the current year, Pilozzi Company has the following information available: Common Stock $5 million Additional Paidminusin Capital $4 million Retained Earnings $2 million Cash $2 million Investment in Trading Securities $50,000 On December 31 of the current year, can the Board of Directors declare and pay a cash dividend of $ 3 million? A. No, Retained Earnings is below $ 3 million. B. No, the cash balance is below $ 3 million. C. Yes, if they can borrow some money, or liquidate some assets. D. No, Cash and Retained Earnings are both below $ 3 million.

Amanufacturer has paid an engineering firm $200,000 to design a new plant, and it will cost another $2 million to build the plant. in the meantime, however, the manufacturer has learned of a foreign company that offers to build an equivalent plant for $2,100,000. what should the manufacturer do?

Which of the following statements is correct? stockholders should generally be happier than bondholders to have managers invest in risky projects with high potential returns as opposed to safe projects with lower expected returns. potential conflicts between stockholders and bondholders are increased if a firm's bonds are convertible into its common stock. takeovers are most likely to be attempted if the target firm’s stock price is above its intrinsic value. one advantage of operating a business as a corporation is that stockholders can deduct their pro rata share of the taxes the firm pays, thereby eliminating the double taxation investors would face in a partnership.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?