Jonas Corporation used $20,000 of direct materials, incurred $40,000 of direct labor cost, and applied $30,000 of manufacturing overhead to jobs this period. No jobs were incomplete at the beginning of the period, but at the end of the period, jobs with a total cost of $25,000 were unfinished. What was the cost of goods manufactured for this period?

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Suppose that fixed costs for a firm in the automobile industry (start-up costs of factories, capital equipment, and so on) are $5 billion and that variable costs are equal to $17,000 per finished automobile. because more firms increase competition in the market, the market price falls as more firms enter an automobile market, or specifically, , where n represents the number of firms in a market. assume that the initial size of the u. s. and the european automobile markets are 300 million and 533 million people, respectively. a. calculate the equilibrium number of firms in the u. s. and european automobile markets without trade. b. what is the equilibrium price of automobiles in the united states and europe if the automobile industry is closed to foreign trade? c. now suppose that the united states decides on free trade in automobiles with europe. the trade agreement with the europeans adds 533 million consumers to the automobile market, in addition to the 300 million in the united states. how many automobile firms will there be in the united states and europe combined? what will be the new equilibrium price of automobiles? d. why are prices in the united states different in (c) and (b)? are consumers better off with free trade? in what ways?

Why is the cournot equilibrium an​ equilibrium? a. there are​ short-run barriers to exit in a cournot​ duopoly, so both firms cannot alter their output levels. b. given the other​ firm's level of​ production, both firms are maximizing profits and cannot improve their situation by unilaterally altering their level of output. c. both firms operate at zero profit under a cournot​ equilibrium, so they would face negative profits if they change output. d. both firms operate at minimum​ long-run average cost under a cournot​ equilibrium, so changes to output would reduce​ long-run profits. even if they​ can't collude, why​ don't firms set their outputs at the joint​ profit-maximizing levels​ (i. e., the levels they would have chosen had they​ colluded)? a. given that other firm produces at the collusive​ level, a firm could increase their own profits by increasing output above the collusive level. b. the midpoint of the collusion curve​ (i. e., the collusive​ outcome) lies below the reaction​ curves, so both firms have an incentive to increase output under the cournot duopoly. c. both a and b are correct d. both a and b are incorrect