Which of the following are included in m2?

i. $5,000 certificate of deposit (cd)
ii. $3,000 debt on a credit card
iii. $1,000 in traveler’s checks
iv. $500 in your piggy bank

a. i and ii
b. i and iii
c. i, iii, and iv
d. i, ii, and iii
e. i, ii, iii, and iv

Ds unlimited has the following transactions during august. august 6 purchases 58 handheld game devices on account from gamegirl, inc., for $140 each, terms 2/10, n/60. august 7 pays $340 to sure shipping for freight charges associated with the august 6 purchase. august 10 returns to gamegirl three game devices that were defective. august 14 pays the full amount due to gamegirl. august 23 sells 38 game devices purchased on august 6 for $160 each to customers on account. the total cost of the 38 game devices sold is $5,448.51. required: record the transactions of ds unlimited, assuming the company uses a perpetual inventory system. (if no entry is required for a transaction/event, select "no journal entry required" in the first account field. round your answers to 2 decimal places.)

73. calculate the weighted average cost of capital (wacc) based on the following information: the equity multiplier is 1.66; the interest rate on debt is 13%; the required return to equity holders is 22%; and the tax rate is 35%. (a) 15.6% (b) 16.0% (c) 15.0% (d) 16.6% (e) none of the above

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?