Acar manufacturer ordered 20,000 window assemblies from a supplier. to make sure the assemblies were made to specifications, the supplier of the window assemblies shipped a sample to the car manufacturer for testing.
this is an example of control.

a) feedback
b) contiguous
c) suboptimal
d) feedforward
e) synergistic

What are the main advantages and disadvantages of organizing a firm as a c corporation? the advantages are: (select all the choices that apply.) a. there is no limit on the number of owners a c corporation may have, thus allowing the corporation to raise substantial amounts of capital. b. the life of the business can continue beyond the death of any of the owners. c. the corporation can use the assets of the owners to pay for corporate liabilities. this attracts smaller investors to the corporation. d. the liability of the owners is limited to the amount of their investment in the firm. the disadvantages are: (select all the choices that apply.) a. income to a c corporation is subject to double taxation, once at the corporate level and again when received by the owners in the form of a dividend. b. the life of the business usually ends with the death of any of the owners. c. the c corporation is more complicated and more expensive to set up than other business entities. d. corporate liabilities can be passed on to the share

What business practice contributed most to andrew carnegie’s ability to form a monopoly?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?