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Business, 18.12.2019 19:31 teneciastclair7

Simone bought two bottles of wine from two vineyards in bordeaux. when asked for an opinion on the quality of the wines, she later mentioned that the pontet canet tasted like alcoholic grape juice, but the chateau margaux had a crisp taste that she really enjoyed. which of the following stages of the buyer decision process do simone's remarks reflect?

a) information search
b) situational analysis
c) evaluation of alternatives
d) purchase decision
e) postpurchase behavior

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